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Introduction
Foreign development aid is an important source of monetary resources for many low-income countries. While low and lower-middle income countries receive on average aid worth around 3% of their respective GDP, in some extreme cases (like Tuvalu after 2008 , or Guinea-Bissau in 1996 aid is around 50% of GDP. Palau even received aid worth more than twice its GDP in 1994, the year of its independence. For donors, on the one hand, aid can be a way to fulfil a perceived responsibility to share their wealth with the needy. On the other hand, it can also be a powerful tool, to attain economic or strategic foreign policy goals.
Especially in the latter sense, the impact of aid on trade has been studied extensively. Most of the studies focus on the benefit for donors in terms of higher bilateral exports. Nilsson (1997) was the first author to estimate a gravity model of trade augmented with foreign aid for European Union donors. Wagner (2003) extended the approach to evaluate aid given by OECD countries. Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2014) and J. Silva and Nelson (2012) consider all donors and recipients. In other studies single donors have been examined (Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2009; Hansen and Rand, 2014; Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann D., Klasen and Johannsen, 2016) . Usually, an effect of aid on donors' exports is found, and the political effect is significant, even though displacement is found in few instances. Other studies, such as Nowak- Lehmann D. et al. (2013) and Petersson and Johansson (2013) focus on the effect of aid on bilateral exports from recipient to donor. While the latter finds positive effects in some cases, the former shows that there is no effect on exports when multilateral resistance terms are controlled for.
There is another reason why it is important to understand the relation between aid and recipient imports, which has been mostly neglected in the literature. Trade is a key issue to understanding the effectiveness of foreign aid in terms of development goals. On the one hand, aid could deteriorate recipients' export performance, for instance due to a Dutch disease effect (Rajan and Subramanian, 2011) . On the other hand, aid is a nominal transfer, and to have a real impact-beyond monetary policy, and redistribution-it has to materialize in imports of goods and services 1 . Of course such an effect does not warrant higher economic growth. It could simply be that aid is mainly consumed as Werker et al. (2009) have found for Muslim recipients, and Temple and Van de Sijpe (2015) for a broader set of countries. This does not necessarily mean that aid is not helping developing countries. After all, it is an international transfer program, and it could be thought of, similar to unemployment benefits, as ensuring some sort of social minimum. But it would be hard to see how aid could materialize in higher growth in this case. If no effect of aid on imports should be found, however, that would preclude any effect on growth.
This paper contributes to the literature by raising, and addressing a specification issue for gravity models including transfers. In particular, we develop a simple extension of the theoretical model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) allowing for international transfers. This framework allows us to study both the effect of total transfers and bilateral transfers received. To our knowledge, there is only one paper (J. Silva and Nelson 2012) that provides a theoretical model including foreign aid, but it treats aid as a trade cost determinant rather than a transfer. Outside the gravity literature Calì and te Velde (2011) and Vijil and Wagner (2012) derive theoretical models, but they do not explicitly model aid as a transfer, either. Moreover, they do not consider the general equilibrium effects in their theoretical models.
Our model suggests that the elasticity of trade with respect to aid depends on the ratio of aid to GDP. Hence, aid matters to the extent that it loosens the budget constraint, or to the extent it inflates the budget set. The relevant variable according to our model is what we call the inflation factor 1 + Aid GDP . This, in turn, implies that the estimated average elasticity of trade with respect to aid will differ if the distribution of the share of aid to GDP changes. Previous studies assumed a constant elasticity of trade with respect to aid. This way, they were not able to account for heterogeneity in the effects of aid, and for the fact that the estimated elasticities are not valid for out-of-sample predictions. Furthermore, our model implies general equilibrium effects that work in a very different way than in previous studies. Aid increases market size, and thus affects the market clearing conditions of partner countries.
In empirical terms, there are three important studies linked to ours. Temple and Van de Sijpe (2015) find a positive effect of total aid on total imports using an instrumental variable approach. Our paper, on the other hand is less concerned with endogeneity-which is a minor issue using bilateral trade data-but rather about specification issues. The second and third studies, by Hansen and Rand (2014) and introduce an inflation factor in their empirical specifications of the gravity model, but do not provide a theoretical model and their analysis is restricted to Danish and Dutch bilateral aid, respectively. Our study complements these empirical findings by providing a general theoretical framework from the recipient perspective and considers aid flows-total and bilateral-from many donors. We estimate a model with a constant elasticity of aid, and compare the results with the model using an inflation factor, that captures by how much aid inflates existing resources (GDP). The models are estimated using the within estimator with bilateral fixed effects and a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator, also with bilateral fixed effects. Based on our theoretical model we are able to compare the coefficient estimates of the two approaches. We find that moderately sized coefficients in the standard model, in some cases imply (implausibly) huge coefficients for the inflation factor. In most cases, however, the implied average parameter values are comparable. Due to the heterogeneity that our model implies, the monetary return of aid in terms of imports differs substantially. Moreover, allowing for country specific coefficients we find that the estimated pattern of heterogeneity is reversed when using the respective alternative specifications.
While we discuss foreign aid in this paper, the model is stated in very general terms, and is in principle applicable for many types of transfers. One example of a possible additional application would be remittances.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the augmented Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model, and derive partial and general equilibrium effects of aid. In section 3 we describe the data sources used for our estimation. Section 4 presents the main empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Model
We use a slightly modified version of the widely cited Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model. Consumers maximize the following CES utility function with homothetic preferences:
All variables are defined in accordance with Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . c ij is the consumption of country i's good in country j. β i > 0 is a distributional parameter. σ is the elasticity of substitution. The main change in the setup as compared to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is in the budget constraint. Let t ij be the net ODA inflow from country i to country j. If t ij > 0 country j is a net recipient. If t ij < 0 country j is a net donor to country i. In turn t ij = −t ji . Each country receives or gives transfers to multiple countries. Let T j = i t ij be net total aid inflows of country j. Then, the budget constraint is:
p ij is the price of the good from country i in country j. Assuming Iceberg trade costs this reduces to p ij = p i τ ij . y j is the income (GDP) of country j. This income is reduced if the country is a donor (T j < 0). The export value from country i to j is as before x ij = p ij c ij , and total production (GDP) equals the sum of all bilateral exports and domestic absorption: y i = j x ij , i.e. the market clearing condition. Optimizing (1) subject to (2) yields:
where
1−σ is the optimal price index. Based on the market clearing condition we get:
Solving for (β i p i ) 1−σ and plugging the result into (3) yields an expression similar to the well known gravity equation: 
and
Up to now, we assumed, that total aid to a given recipient (T j ) shifts the budget constraint outwards. In order to account for the fact that some aid never reaches the recipient country rewrite (2):
This implies that the fraction of aid that gets lost is slightly increasing in the share of aid in GDP. Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of aid on the budget simulated for different values of γ. As can be seen the deviation from a proportional effect are generally not dramatic. Introducing this type of friction has a bearing on the remaining equations. (5) becomes: 
t to aid
Hence, the partial effect of aid with respect to trade is non-linear, and depends on the ratio of aid to GDP. This implies that there is a bias in typical studies of aid effects on trade. Typically , aid is included in logs (Nilsson 1997; Wagner 2003; Nowak-Lehmann D. et al. 2013; Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2014 ; among others), which implies a constant elasticity of trade w.r.t aid, i.e.
On the contrary the model derived here implies
Hence the average elasticity (ignoring GE effects) should be
where F (x) is the cumulative density function of the share of aid to GDP. That means, that according to the theory presented here the elasticities of trade with respect to aid should vary according to sample. In particular, when countries are included that do not receive any aid, a lower effect of aid will be found. Figure 2 shows the relation of aid to GDP and the elasticity of trade w.r.t. aid. Additionally, vertical lines are inserted that represent different percentiles of the empirical distribution for the aid to GDP ratio (using a sample of low and lower middle income countries). The red line refers to the median, the solid black lines represent the 25th and 75th percentile respectively and the dashed lines show the 5th and the 95th percentile. The median aid to GDP ratio is around 2.4%, and the empirical distribution seems to be quite concentrated around the median. About 50% of observations are located in a range of 6 percentage points around the median. Of course there are a number of notable outliers (e.g. Afghanistan, Eritrea, Liberia, North Korea, Palau). But if estimation is dominated by low aid to GDP observations we are posed to find a low elasticity of trade w.r.t. aid, and thus potentially underestimate positve effects aid could have, in particular the effect of increased aid flows to specific countries.
Beyond out-of-sample predictions there is a further problem regarding the estimation of the aid elasticity if aid is included in levels. It is straightfoward that:
with
ǫ j enters the error term if aid is included merely in levels. This can lead to a substantial downward bias of the estimates. The bias can be quite severe, as the variable of interest is perfectly correlated with part of the error term: Corr T j ,
The bias due tot the second term in equation (13) depends on the specific sample. It is crucial to realize that the most important part of the bias, is thus due to the omission of the term "1+" in (12). Thus, while we fully agree with Wagner (2003, p. 162 ) that adding one is not "an immaterial adjustment" 3 , the conclusion here is the different: The "+1" adjustment is required to take the nature of aid as a transfer into account, and the omission of "+1" leads to a serious bias. In extreme cases, this can even affect whether we attribute a positive or negative effect to aid.
For completeness, note that the inclusion of a transfer also affects the exporter price term, and rules out Π i = P i as a general solution. 
ln
The domestic price index P j is the same as in Baier and Bergstrand (2009) . However, there is a change with respect to market potential Π i regarding the weights. If a country receives aid (from another country) it gains importance as a potential market. Any country that is farther away from the recipient than from the donor will, then, find it more difficult to sell their products and thus have to reduce prices to clear their market. If a country is closer to the recipient than to the donor the reverse applies.
Data
Bilateral trade data from 1988 to 2013 for 188 countries is taken from UN-COMTRADE. Data on income and population variables are drawn from the World Bank (World Development Indicators Database, 2015) . Distances between capitals computed as great-circle distances using data on straightline distances in kilometres, latitudes and longitudes, trade impeding or promoting factors such as being a former colony and sharing a common language or a common border are taken from the CEPII data base. The RTA dummy is from de Sousa (2012). Data on aid flows are obtained from the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD, 2015) . Table A .1 in the Appendix reports summary statistics.
Empirical Application
In this section we present estimation results for different versions of the gravity model augmented with foreign aid, by applying the model presented in the theoretical section and compare it with a model that adds aid as a part of trade costs. The main results are reported in Table 1 . In columns (1)- (3) log-linearized versions of equation (5) are estimated using panel fixed effects techniques with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. In columns (4)- (6) the multiplicative model is estimated using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation with logarithmic link function. In both sets of specifications country-pair fixed effects capture time-invariant trade cost determinants and the multilateral resistiance terms (14) and (15). Additionaly, we include time-fixed effects to control for global shocks.
In column 1 results for the traditional model are reported. Since lnAid is not defined for Aid ≤ 0 the sample is restricted to aid recipients. Column 2 retains this restricted sample and reports results for the inflation factor 1 + Tj yj . Since the inflation factor is positive for almost all plausible values of T j this specification can be expanded to a much larger sample. In column (3) we lift the restriction and estimate the specification with the inflation factor for the full sample.
In all cases the coefficients on aid are highly significant. In accordance with theory, the coefficient on the inflation factor is considerably larger. However, in terms of magnitudes the coefficients are not strictly comparable. Column (1) gives the average elasticity of bilateral aid with respect to GDP j . In column 2 and 3 the estimates for our parameter γ are reported. It can be interpreted as the passthrough or multiplier effect. A coefficient of 1 indicates that aid fully enters the receiving countries' budget. A value below 1 but higher than the coefficient of country j's GDP means that aid is spent relatively more on imports. A value that is indistinguishable from GDP indicates that aid is just another part of the receiving countries' budget. A value below that, indicates incomplete pass-through. However, it is also possible that the coefficient surpasses 1 in which case there would be a multiplier effect of aid, somehow crowding in other parts of the budget or new sources of funds.
In order to make the coefficients comparable we calculate the implied average aid to trade elasticities using equation (11) for the specifications using the inflation factor. For the specifications using ln Aid we use the inverse function of (11) to calculate the implied values of γ. Note that the continuous mapping theorem implies that the same significance levels and t-statistics apply for the transformed parameters. For brevity, however, we report them only once.
The result of a high pass-through is robust through all specifications. In column 2 the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from 1 suggesting full pass-through. Exploiting the full sample-i.e. including importers with no aid received-the coefficient is slightly reduced, but still indistinguishable from 1. In column 1 the implied value for γ is smaller, only slightly above the coefficient of GDP. In all cases the result suggests that the pass-through is very high, and at least in terms of imports, aid seems to in fact inflate the existing budget. In accordance with these patterns, the estimates for the average elasticy are higher in column 2.
In their seminal article, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that due to Jensen's inequality loglinearized estimations of the gravity equation produce biased elasticity estimates if the multiplicative error term is heteroskedastic. In turn, they advocate the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator to become the new workhorse of gravity estimation. Table 1 reports the results for this set of estimations in columns (4)-(6). Note that another widely discussed feature of PPML is its ability to cope with zero trade flows. Hence, the sample is much bigger when using PPML estimation. Qualitatively, the results look similar, even though the coefficient on ln Aid j in column (4) is higher now, while for ln 1 + Aidj GDPj in columns (5) and (6) the effect is lower.
The PPML procedure practically eliminates the difference between the full sample (column 6) and the restricted one (column 5) compared to the fixed effect regressions in columns 3 and 2. However, results using ln Aid change dramatically. While the elasticity estimate of 0.075 does seem reasonable, it implies an average pass-through of 1.7. That would mean that the effect is 1.7 times higher than if it was simply part of the budget. I.e. it would imply considerable crowding in.
The comparison above uses averages and does not take into account, that the effect of aid is constant in one case while it is decreasing in GDP in the other. This difference comes to bear when calculating the average implication in $ terms for total trade. Letγ 1 represent the estimated coefficients from the ln Aid specification, andγ 1 the coefficient for the inflation factor. For ln Aid j the effect in US $ can be calculated as factor. 5 We report both average partial effects (APE), and partial effects at the average (PEA) in table 2. In the former case the average of ratios is calculated while in the latter case it is a ratio of averages. In terms of interpretation, the APE reports the effect of an additional US $ of development aid on average. I.e. it is the mean of the partial effects calculated for each observation seperately. The PEA calculates the partial effect of an additional US $ for a hypothetical observation where all variables have their respective mean value. While the literature tends to report the PEA we prefer the APE, as a) the PEA does not take into account the correlations between the variables, hence the hypothetical observation might be greatly unrepresentative of the sample, and b) a main implication of our model is the heterogeneity of the effect of aid; calculating the effect at the mean of all variables does not properly take that into account. Table 2 reports the number of unique country-year observations, the average partial effect (APE), the standard deviation of the indiviual partial effects, minimum, maximum and median, and lastly the partial effect at the average (PEA).
In fact, the implied $ changes in imports differ. Firstly, individual partial effects are far more dispersed in case ln Aid is used 6 . The standard deviations are higher than for the inflation factor by several orders of magnitude. The reason for this is straightforward, since with a constant elasticity of trade with respect to aid, for those countries that receive relatively little aid or export a lot, a percentage change in aid is absolutely small, whereas a percentage change in trade is absolutely high. I.e., a constant elasticity implies that countries with a higher ratio of exports to aid have a higher absolute effect of aid (In our sample the most extreme such cases include Bermuda, Croatia and Macedonia). With the inflation factor -implying that the elasticity is lower for countries with higher GDP -these outliers play a much smaller role. The reason is that countries that export relatively more, or receive relatively small amounts of aid tend to have a higher GDP on average. The role of outliers becomes even more apparent when looking at the stark difference between median and mean for the individual partial effects. The median is much lower and especially so, when looking at either specification including ln Aid.
Secondly, in both cases the APE (i.e. the mean of PE) is significantly higher if ln Aid is used, but 5 The derivations are as follows:
This finding is in accordance with Hansen and Rand (2014) hardly realistic. An average of 11$ more trade for each 1 $ of additional aid already seems outlandish, let alone 31$. However, using the PEAs results seem less extreme, and results for ln Aid might even look more plausible now. We already made the case, that APE is more representative of the sample. But the stark contrast between PEAs and APEs nonetheless makes it worthwhile delving into the reasons for this disparity. In purely technical terms, the reason is that within the highest quintile of importers (judging by total annual imports) there is a significant negative correlation (-0.07) between imports and aid, generating some values for the import-aid ratio that are extraordinarily high. (Dropping these countries drastically reduces the APE); i.e. the fact that aid and imports are moving in opposite directions makes these observations extremely powerful concerning the average partial effect, but much less so for PEA. (Since PEA uses averages of each variable, the co-movement does not matter.) But if the individual partial effects appear unrealistically high, this tells us something important about the treatment of heterogeneity in the specification. After all, the assumption in the usual approach is that there is a constant elasticiy. Calculating the PEA -i.e. the partial effect at average valuesmakes it impossible to assess the implication of that assumption. Only when looking at the APE do we see that the heterogeneity in the effects is better captured (or at least more plausible) when using the inflation factor. And since this is the main point of the new method, this should be preferable.
Heterogenous Slopes
In the preceding section we were looking at heterogeneity as implied by the two alternative models based on the assumption of equal slopes for all countries. Still it is by no means plausible to argue that our proposed model captures all the heterogeneity in the effects of aid. If our model is really better to capture heterogenous effects it should also have less dispersed parameter values. To assess this question we estimate the models allowing for recipient specific slopes. The summary statistics for the implied parameter values are reported in Table 3 . Note: The number of observations indicates the number of countries for which the parameters have been estimated.
Evidently, the implied average elasticities are less dispersed using the inflation factor, showing a smaller range of values and a smaller standard deviation. Also the standard deviation for γ is much smaller using our approach, as indicated by the standard deviation in column 3 (first part of Table 3 ). All in all it seems, that there is less heterogeneity when using the inflation factor, even though a lot of heterogeneity remains unexplained.
Strikingly, however, the pattern of heterogeneity seems to be negatively related across specifications. Table 4 reports correlation coefficients among the estimated parameters. The values for γ for the two specifications have a highly significant correlation coefficient of around -0.4, and the correlation for the elasticities of trade with respect to aid the corresponding figure is -0.11 albeit insignificant. Also correlations between γ and average elasticities are negative and significant across specifications, while positive and significant within specifications (as expected). This illustrates the relevance of choosing the specification. Table A .2 in the appendix reports the average parameter values by country. It reveals that the negative correlation does not only pertain to the ordering of the effects. In some casesthe use of the alternative specification even changes the sign of the effect. 
Political Extension
Aside from studying aggregate aid flows the advocated framework also lends itself to the study of political effects of aid. 7 Consider that:
which holds as long as γ = γ ROW = γ bil . The first right hand side term measure by how much the existing domestic budget is inflated by aid from the rest of the world (ROW). The second term captures by how much this inflated budget is further inflated by bilateral aid. The first term can be thought of as simple budget effect. The second term can be thought of as a political effect and-reasonablyimposes that the effect of bilateral aid should not only depend on the given GDP of the receiving country, but also be negatively related to other countries aid. The condition under which equation (16) holds states that all aid is budgetary, i.e. that there is no political effect of aid. A political effect of aid prevails iff γ bil > γ ROW .
From there the average elasticity of bilateral aid is easily determined. Similar to (11) we get γ bil 1 0 tij yj +Tj dF tij yj +Tj . Perhaps somewhat more interesting, it is possible to distinguish the network and the budget effect of ROW aid.
I.e. the budget effect looks like before except that bilateral aid is excluded. As for the political effect, the detrimental effect of aid from the rest of the world is relatively high, when both bilateral aid and aid from the rest of the world are an important source of income. Equation (17) also illustrates that the overall effect can only be negative when either the pure budget effect is small or when the bilateral effect or the importance of bilateral aid is big enough. Table 5 presents the results for this exercise. For brevity, we only report fixed effects estimation and focus on the implicit values for our parameters of interest. The implicit bilateral γ is extremely high in the traditional specification. The value implies that the effect of bilateral aid is 16-times an ordinary budget effect and hence much higher than in our preferred specification. Here, there still seems to be a considerable network effect, but it is much smaller. Similarly, the estimated average elasticity is much higher in the traditional estimation. However, results regarding aid from the rest of the world seem remarkably similar. Both specifications suggest (using the decomposition in equation (17)) that aid from the rest of the world on average has hardly any detrimental effect on trade. In Table 6 we report the implied values in $ terms. Clearly, there is more heterogeneity in the bilateral effects. But even more clearly our approach significantly reduces heterogeneity in comparison with the traditional approach. The implied values are always smaller when using the inflation factor. An average increase of 0.02$ Cents of bilateral (not aggregate) trade for each additional 1 US $ of aid from other countries (ROW effects, APE) seems reasonable, given that all trade partners enjoy this effect. Even though there remains a strong budget effect, there is also a benefit from bilateral aid, albeit a meagre 0.06$ Cents (on average) for 1 $ of aid. Still this effect is more than twice the effect from other donor's aid.
However, a considerable amount of heterogeneity remains. Interestingly, in few cases other donor's aid in fact seems to reduce bilateral trade. For some donors aid clearly seems to pay for itself with values of up to 33$ of additional imports, in return for 1 additional US $ of aid.
Conclusions
The theoretical model presented in this paper takes the nature of aid as a transfer into account and implies a non-constant elasticity of aid with respect to trade. In particular, the elasticity is increasing in the share of aid to GDP. The intuition behind this is simple. For a comparatively richer country receiving little aid, a 1 percent change of aid is negligible. However, for a poorer country, getting more aid, a 1 percent change might be a significant shift in the budget constraint. Hence, what really matters for recipient countries is by how much aid flows increase their purchasing power and not the percentage change of aid per se.
Not taking this fact into account invalidates out-of-sample predictions, potentially induces biases and neglects an interesting heterogeneity in the effect of aid.
Our theoretical model implies that foreign aid changes the so called multilateral resistance terms. As the country gains economic importance, its influence on other countries' market clearance grows. For the infinitesimal changes we consider in this paper the implied general equilibrium effects are negligible. When considering more extreme scenarios (i.e. complete elimination of aid) they will come to bear, and should be considered in such analyses.
The empirical results obtained suggest that the pass-through of aid, i.e. the extent to which aid shifts the budget constraint, is surprisingly high. In all specifications the effect is at least as high as the effect of GDP, suggesting that aid in fact enters the budget of the recipient almost fully. While the traditional and the proposed specifications are in agreement in this point, there are substantial differences concerning the implied change in monetary terms. The reason for this disparity is due to the different underlying patterns of heterogeneity. While in the traditional specification the aid elasticity is constant, using the inflation factor implies that the elasticity is increasing in the share of aid to GDP and hence decreasing in GDP. In turn, also the effect in money terms is constant in GDP in the first case, but strongly declining in GDP in our model framework.
In summary, the theoretical case for using the proposed inflation factor is strong, and also empirically, we find that the inflation factor produces more plausible results. 
